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JUSTIFYING ACTS OF DENIALISM
The Case of Prisoner 
Disenfranchisement in the UK
Samantha Morgan-Williams*
1. INTRODUCTION
Th is paper will explore the case of prisoner disenfranchisement in the United 
Kingdom1 (hereinaft er UK) as a concrete example of political denialism and 
human rights. It will explore the basis of denialism and human rights, from two 
approaches, asking both how and why denialism is perpetrated and justifi ed in 
the UK. Initially seeking to challenge how the blanket ban on prisoner voting is 
justifi ed at a domestic level. Th e paper will then identify why political denialism 
is contentious within the concrete example that prisoner disenfranchisement 
provides, determining the conceptual and legal basis and subsequent political 
support for the prisoner voting ban.
In examining how political actors, such as the UK Government,2 justify 
continued denial of rights at the expense of their obligations under the ECHR, 
this paper highlights the prisoner voting rights case as concrete example of 
political or functional denialism in practice. It therefore aff ords an excellent 
example within which to address why denialism is committed and consequently 
how a state can justify continued human rights violations. In looking beyond 
the act of denialism and addressing the justifi cations themselves, this paper 
contributes to deepening understanding of situations where the State power is 
the main perpetrator of denialism.
* PhD Candidate, Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, University College Cork, 
Ireland.
1 For the purpose of this paper the ‘United Kingdom’ is used in direct reference to the 
executive, judiciary and legislative (Parliament) unless indicated otherwise.
2 For the purposes of this chapter, Government refers exclusively to Her Majesty’s Government, 
commonly referred to as the UK Government, which is currently formed of Members of 
Parliament from the Conservative Party, led by Prime Minister David Cameron.
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2. DENIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICAL 
DENIALISM
Scholars working within this fi eld have largely drawn upon the works of Stanley 
Cohen in identifying the forms of denial.3 At the Conference associated with 
this collection of papers entitled Denialism and Human Rights,4 a number of 
forms of denialism where thus identifi ed. Th e most notable of these was given by 
Prof. Eric Heinze5 who outlined the forms which denial has been recognised 
to take within the fi eld of human rights.6 Th ese were identifi ed as factual, 
normative, justifi able and political denialism.7
Th e fi rst of these, factual denial, occurs where a series of events or conduct 
is questioned as to ever having existed. A key example of such would be 
Holocaust or more generally genocide denial.  Secondly, denialism within 
human rights can be normative in form, where it is disputed whether a 
norm can be considered as a human right. An example of this would be the 
denial of rights to certain groups of minority or even unfavourable groups. 
Normative denialism is therefore normally characterised as the refusal to 
grant certain classes of citizens their human rights.8 Th irdly, justifi able or 
defensible denialism is a form of denialism present within human rights 
when the perpetrator seeks to justify a derogation or denial of human rights. 
A core example is found within the European Convention on Human Rights 
system (hereinaft er ECHR or Convention) where certain rights are ‘derogable’ 
in times of emergency or state crisis for the protection of state security.9 Th e 
3 For more on this see; S, COHEN, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suff ering, 2nd 
ed., Polity Press, Staff ord BC 2010.
4 Denialism and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University 22nd & 
23rd January 2015.
5 Prof. Eric Heinze, Professor of Law and Humanities, Queen Mary University of London.
6 E. Heinze, presentation entitled ‘Functional Denial and the Politics of Human Rights,’ given 
at ‘Denialism and Human Rights,’ Faculty of Law Maastricht University 22nd & 23rd January 
2015. Heinze’s presentation and his identifi cation of four forms of human rights denial are 
representative of existing research into this area, for more on Heinze’s own work in the area 
of politics and human rights see; E.  Heinze, ‘Even-handedness and the Politics of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 21 Harvard Human Rights Journal pp. 7 – 46 and E. Heinze and R. Freedman, 
‘Public Awareness of Human Rights: Distortions in the Mass Media’, (2009) 12 International 
Journal of Human Rights.
7 In his recent publication, Aft er Sustainability, Denial, Hope, Retrieval, John Foster, 
draws exclusively upon the work of Stanley Cohen in identifying the forms of denialism 
prevalent within climate change denialism. He notes that these are literal, interpretative 
and implicative denial. For more on this see; J. Froster, Aft er Sustainability: Denial, Hope, 
Retrieval, Routledge, London 2015.
8 Th e debate surrounding the legitimacy of the right to development, or even the validity of 
human rights for animals could serve as an example of normative human rights.
9 Article 15 ECHR allows states to derogate from certain rights guaranteed by the Convention 
in time of ‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. Permissible 
derogations under Article 15 must meet three substantive conditions: there must be a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation; any measures taken in response must be ‘strictly 
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fourth and fi nal example of denialism oft en present within human rights is 
political or functional denialism. Political denialism occurs where an act 
which results in a denial of rights is seen by a political power as necessary or 
intrinsic to values.10
Th e latter form ‘political or functional denialism,’ is that which this 
paper concerns itself with, and is arguably the rarest in practice within 
the fi eld of human rights. Th is is owing to a number of factors. Th ese draw 
extensively from the general and driving principles behind human rights, 
which recognise that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent 
to all human beings, inalienable, applicable to all regardless of gender, sex 
or race, and that everyone be treated equally in dignity and rights. Within 
Europe in particular, there is a clear consensus that upholding human rights 
and honouring human rights standards is key to a State’s standing and this 
is represented by the reputation of the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Human Rights and the associated European Court of Human Rights.11 Th us, 
states are oft en unwilling to be seen as complicity or knowingly committing 
acts of denial of human rights
A central theme when addressing denialism is oft en that the nature of 
the denial itself remains either fully or partly unacknowledged.12 However, 
in instances of political or functional denialism, the denial of human rights 
is not only acknowledged by the off ending political power, but even widely 
supported and its continuation justifi ed, as is the case within the prisoner 
disenfranchisement debate. In the case of political denialism of human 
rights, it is rare for a state to openly and consistently fl out or ‘deny’ its human 
required by the exigencies of the situation’, and the measures taken in response to it, must be 
in compliance with a state’s other obligations under international law.
10 However, a point to consider here is the nature of human rights itself. Is it more a matter of 
us not previously regarding political denialism as a form of denialism? Given a number of 
factors such as human rights systems allowed (to some extent) for derogations and excuses for 
denying in limited circumstances and given that states rarely directly admit to denying but 
may only comply in very limited or superfi cial ways. Could it be said that political denialism 
is in fact present within all human rights enforcement regimes? Given that considering more 
controversial issues such as implementation of socio-economic rights as opposed to civil and 
political rights are seen to be more aspirational rather than intrinsic?
11 Although it must be noted here, that as the case study of this paper shows that this does 
not mean that in a system where the is largely, strong respect for human rights that human 
rights abuses and derogations from human rights standards do not occur. Rather, that where 
a strong system exists, within which there is a functioning consensus that human rights be 
respected and upheld, that this acts as a sort of ‘peer-pressure’ mentality, acting as a deterrent. 
No state therefore wishes to be thought of as a state which does not respect human rights.
12 For more on this see C.A.R Moerland, Conference presentation entitled ‘Th e killing of death 
– Th e BBC documentary Rwanda’s untold story and the denial of the genocide against the 
Tutsi’, given at ‘Denialism and Human Rights’, Maastricht University Faculty of Law, 22nd 
and 23rd January 2015; and also ‘Meaning In Motion And Merging Discourses: How Scholars 
And Journalists Recycle Th e Ideological Denial Of Th e Genocide Against Th e Tutsi.’ Siena, 
Italy, 10th Biennial Conference of the International Association of Genocide Scholars.
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rights duties and obligations. However, in the UK the denial of voting rights 
for prisoners is a widely supported stance within both political, public and 
media spheres, which it is argued by proponents is ‘enshrined in British 
democratic tradition.’13 Th e legal and conceptually basis for this blanket ban 
will now be addressed before the justifi cations for the ban itself are examined.
2.1. PRISONER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UK
Under domestic law, Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 198314 
indiscriminately disenfranchises all prisoners. Th is act creates a blanket ban 
under which prisoners serving a custodial sentence do not have the right to vote 
during their incarceration, and only those on remand may partake in elections:
‘(1) A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution 
in pursuance of his sentence [or unlawfully at large when he would otherwise 
be so detained] is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local 
government election.’
Under this legal provision, prisoners are barred from exercising the right to 
vote, which is a well-documented basic civil liberty and widely recognised 
in international law. Protection for this right is expressly provided under in 
a variety of international and regional systems including Article  21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ECHR Article  3 Protocol 1.15 
Article 3 Protocol 1 of the ECHR dictates that states belonging to the Council of 
Europe, must guarantee ‘free elections…under conditions which will ensure the 
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’16
13 See both D. Grieve, MP (2011) 523 HC Deb. 511 and D. Cameron, MP, (2010) 517 HC Deb. 921.
14 Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 as amended by the Representation of the 
People Act 1985 and 2000.
15 Other International Legal Instruments which protect the right to vote include but are not 
limited to: the Charter of the Organization of American States, the African (Banjul) Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and many other international human rights documents 
Organisation For Security and Cooperation In Europe (OSCE) International Standards Of 
Elections (1990), European Union (EU) Council Regulations 975/99 And 976/99 (1999), 
Organization Of American States (OAS) American Convention on Human Rights (entered 
into force 1978) see <www.oas.org/> for all OAS documents. Inter-American Convention on 
the Granting of Political Rights to Women (entered into force 1954) Article 23 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights and Article  20 of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man guarantee the right of citizens to vote and be elected in genuine periodic 
elections. African Union (Formerly Organisation of African Unity), African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (1981), Article 13(1) of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights provides that every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in their government.
16 Full text of the Convention and Protocols available at: <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf>.
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Th e current blanket ban on prisoner disenfranchisement in the UK under 
domestic legislation has been found contrary to the ECHR as Section 3 of the 
Representation of the People Act confl icts with Article  3 of Protocol 1 of the 
Convention’s provisions. As a result, the UK has been found to be in violation of 
its treaty obligations and is obliged to align domestic legislation with the relevant 
ECHR provisions (preamble ECHR, and Article 46).17 Th is resulted in a number 
of cases coming before the ECtHR (Hirst,18 Greens & M.T.,19 Scoppola,20 Firth,21 
and McHugh)22 where the Court found the blanket ban to constitute a direct 
violation of the UK’s human rights obligations.
Yet, the UK has failed to apply these judgments and amend the current 
legislation. Th is refusal to follow the ECtHR clearly demonstrates tensions 
in the UK between politics and human rights protections, as the UK is 
purposefully failing in its obligations to uphold minimum human rights 
standards, denying not only prisoners the rights owed to them under the 
Convention’s provisions, but also denying the supremacy of the Court itself in 
matters of human rights.
2.2. PRISONER DISENFRANCHISEMENT CASE LAW 
BEFORE THE ECtHR
On 30  March 2004, the ECtHR gave its judgment in the case of Hirst v Th e 
UK.23 Seven judges at the ECtHR ruled that the UK’s ban on prisoners’ voting 
17 Article  46 Binding force and execution of judgments: ‘Th e High Contracting Parties 
undertake to abide by the fi nal judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 
2. Th e fi nal judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which 
shall supervise its execution. 3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision 
of the execution of a fi nal judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the 
judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. 
A referral decision shall require a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled 
to sit on the committee. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting 
Party refuses to abide by a fi nal judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, aft er serving 
formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that 
Party has failed to fulfi l its obligation.’
18 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-II.
19 Greens and M.T. v. Th e United Kingdom, no. 60041/08, ECHR 2010.
20 Scoppola v. Italy, no.126/05, ECHR 2012-III.
21 Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 47784/09, ECHR 2014.
22 McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 51987/08, ECHR 2015.
23 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-II. In the case John Hirst, a prisoner 
serving a life sentence for manslaughter had challenged the ban on prisoners’ votes aft er 
previously losing the case in the High Court. Although this was the fi rst time the issue of 
prisoner disenfranchisement was brought before the ECtHR in a British context, there 
had been challenges to the validity of the RPA under the ECHR at a domestic level. R v (1) 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2) Two Election Registration Offi  cers, Ex Parte (1) 
Pearson (2) Martinez: Hirst v HM Attorney General (2001) [2001] EWHC Admin 239. Hirst 
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breached the ECHR. Th e Government subsequently appealed the decision.24 
Upon appeal, the Grand Chamber of the Court held, by a majority of 12 to 5 
that a blanket ban preventing all convicted prisoners from voting, irrespective 
of the nature or gravity of their off ences, constituted a violation of Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1 ECHR.25
‘Th ere was, therefore, no question that prisoners forfeit their Convention rights 
merely because of their status as detainees following conviction. Nor was there any 
place under the Convention system, where tolerance and broadmindedness were the 
acknowledged hallmarks of democratic society, for automatic disenfranchisement 
based purely on what might off end public opinion.’26
Th e Court accepted the UK’s argument that Member States should have a wide 
discretion as to how they regulate a ban on prisoners voting. ‘[B]oth as regards 
the types of off ence that should result in the loss of the vote and as to whether 
disenfranchisement should be ordered by a judge in an individual case or should 
result from general application of a law.’27
It recognised, however, that due to a violation of the above Protocol, that 
reform was necessitated in this instance. Although it advocated legislative 
change, the court did not give any detailed guidance as to the steps that the UK 
should take to make its law compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Stating 
that it was for each Member State of the Council of Europe to decide on its own 
rules under the margin of appreciation, as is the norm under the Convention 
rules of interpretation.28, 29
had fi rst challenged the ban in the High Court, but lost in 2001 when the court ruled that it 
was compatible with the European Convention for prisoners to lose the right to a say in how 
the country was governed.
24 Under Article 43 the Case may be referred to the Grand Chamber, however, the parties have 
a three-month deadline following the delivery of a Chamber judgment to request referral of 
the case to the Grand Chamber for fresh consideration. Requests for referral to the Grand 
Chamber are examined by a panel of judges which decides whether referral is appropriate.
25 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-II.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Th is position was reiterated in Frodl v. Austria, no. 20201/04, ECHR 2010 reference 
where a breach of Article  3 Protocol No. 1 was found against Austria as his objective 
disenfranchisement denied him the rights aff orded to him under this Article. Th e applicant, 
who was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1993 in Austria, alleged 
that his disenfranchisement constituted a breach of his rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 because he was serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year. Th e fact that there 
was no subjective decision on the matter and that the matter was not decided on a case to case 
basis but instead amounted to a blanket ban meant that the judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights, which became fi nal on 4 October 2010, held that there had been a breach of 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
29 Th is was again reiterated post-Scoppola in a press release by Registrar of the Court of ECHR 
222 (2012) 22.05.2012. For more see: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.
aspx?i=003–3953519–4581929#{‘itemid’:[‘003–3953519–4581929’]}.
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‘Th e Court accepts that this is an area in which a wide margin of appreciation 
should be granted to the national legislature in determining whether restrictions 
on prisoners’ right to vote can still be justifi ed in modern times and if so how a fair 
balance is to be struck. In particular, it should be for the legislature to decide whether 
any restriction on the right to vote should be tailored…It cannot accept however that 
an absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstances falls within 
an acceptable margin of appreciation.’30
Th e breach of Protocol No. 1 was again brought before the court in Greens & 
M.T31 aft er the UK failed to implement the Hirst judgment. Th e applicants in this 
instance complained that the refusal to enrol them on the Electoral Register for 
domestic and European elections was in violation of Article  3 of Protocol No. 
1. In its Chamber judgment of 23  November 2010, the European Court again 
found a violation of the right to free elections against the UK. Finding that the 
Government of the UK had failed to amend the blanket ban legislation, or 
even attempted any means of legislative reform, bringing domestic law in line 
with the ECHR as required under previous judgment Hirst.32 Th e Court held 
that the Government should immediately bring forward legislative proposals 
to amend the law and to enact the legislation within a period decided by the 
Committee of Ministers.33
‘Applying its pilot judgment procedure, the Court has given the UK Government six 
months from the date when Greens and M.T. becomes fi nal to introduce legislative 
proposals to bring the disputed law/s in line with the Convention.’34
Initially the UK was given a six-month time frame by the Committee of 
Ministers within which to bring forward proposals.35 Th is was extended, 
however, by Scoppola v Italy (No 3)36 when the UK intervened as a third 
party.37 In this instance the Court held that there had been a breach of Article 3 
30 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, §41, ECHR 2005-II.
31 Greens and M.T. v. Th e United Kingdom, no. 60041/08, ECHR 2010.
32 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-II.
33 Th e Committee of Ministers (CM) is the executive arm of the Council of Europe which 
supervises the implementation of the Court’s judgments. Once a judgment becomes fi nal, it is 
transmitted to the CM for supervision of its implementation. Further information about the 
implementation process can be found here: <www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution>.
34 ECHR press notice 23 November 2010.
35 See 1157th meeting notes, Hirst No. 2 Group, decision 6 at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.
jsp?id=2013315>.
36 Th e applicant, Franco Scoppola was sentenced in 2002 to life incarceration for a multitude of 
serious crimes. Under Italian law, his life sentence entailed a lifetime ban from public offi  ce, 
amounting to permanent rescinding of his right to vote. Scoppola subsequently complained 
that the ban on public offi  ce imposed as a result of his sentencing had amounted to a permanent 
forfeiture of his entitlement to vote which constituted a violation of Article 3 Protocol 1.
37 Th e extension gave the United Kingdom 6 months from the judgment date within which the 
implement either proposals or aff ect legislative change, making the deadline 22 November 2012.
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Protocol No. 1 in the form of the disenfranchisement of Mr. Scoppola and 
reiterated that the position of the UK (as observer State under ) was contrary to 
the ECHR:
‘Th e Court reiterated that a blanket ban on the right of prisoners to vote during 
their detention constituted an ‘automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally 
important Convention right… falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, 
however wide that margin may be.’38
Th is belligerent refusal has brought the focus of the Committee of Ministers into 
play; as is standard following an ECtHR ruling, as the case(s) were referred to 
the Committee as the task of supervising judgment executions is vested with 
the body under Article  46(2) of the ECHR.39 In the UK, little has been done 
in the case of prisoner voting rights to implement the Hirst and Greens & M.T 
judgments, and the Government has made clear that the topic and the possibility 
of enforced change is a deeply unpopular one with both itself and the public.40 
It appears here that much of the delay in reform has been premised on the 
understanding that the disenfranchisement of prisoners has been a consistent 
feature of the UK’s history as a parliamentary democracy, a point tabloids have 
seized upon.41
38 Scoppola v. Italy, no. 126/05, ECHR 2012-II.
39 Th e article provides that ‘the fi nal judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Council 
of Europe, which shall supervise its execution.’ Pursuant to this, Rule 3(a) outlines that 
respondent states are under a duty in the case of a violation to inform the Committee of 
measures taken to resolve the circumstances under which the violation occurred. Adversely 
under Rule 4 of the Committee Rules until the state fully complies with the judgment that the 
issue will continue to refer back to the Committee’s agenda every 6 months until the above 
measures and proceedings are satisfi ed.
40 YouGov survey undertaken by Dr Joel Faulkner Rogers at the Cambridge POLIS 
Department entitled ‘Prisoner voting: viva the ‘civic death’ penalty?’ Th e fi nding of said 
survey available at <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/02/06/update-attitudes-prison-voting-
viva-civic-death-pe/> show a continued strong public support for the continuation of 
disenfranchisement of those incarcerated. Th e survey fi nds that this is in line with previous 
fi ndings in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Fieldwork was conducted online between 25–26  January 
2015, with a total sample of 1656 British adults, and the survey was developed in collaboration 
with William Warr, currently a student on the Masters in Public Policy at the Cambridge 
POLIS Department, and his supervisor, David Howarth, who is also Director of the course.
 Th e survey began with a split-sample experiment to compare the eff ect of describing the 
ECtHR ruling as coming from either a ‘European’ or an ‘international’ court when asking 
about UK law on prisoner voting. Th e sample was randomly divided and each sub-sample 
answered variants of the same question.
41 Specifi cally over prisoner votes: D. Davis and J. Straw, ‘We must defy Strasbourg on prisoner 
votes’, 2012 Th e Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9287633/
We-must-defy-Strasbourg-on-prisoner-votes.html> accessed 13.04.2015.
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2.3. DEVELOPMENTS 2014–2015
Recent cases before the Court both Firth and Others v. the UK42 and McHugh 
& Others v UK,43 held that the blanket ban on prisoner voting was contrary to 
the Convention.44 Despite fi nding yet again that the UK continues to violate 
prisoners’ rights to participate in elections, the Strasbourg court declined to 
order that any of claimants be awarded payment in form of redress fi nding the 
ruling to be in itself just satisfaction.
In McHugh, the Court held:
‘there had been a violation of article 3 of protocol No 1 because the case was identical 
to other prisoner voting cases in which a breach of the right to vote had been found 
and the relevant legislation had not yet been amended … the fi nding of a violation 
constitutes in itself suffi  cient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage 
sustained by the applicants …’ It dismissed ‘the remainder of the applicants’ claim 
for just satisfaction.’45
Th e Court once again held that States have a broad discretion under the margin 
of appreciation as to how they could implement Article  3 Protocol No. 1 
regarding the rights of those in prison, ultimately holding as it did in previous 
judgments that there is no means by which a blanket ban can be reconciled with 
the provisions of Protocol No. 1:
‘Th e rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. Th ere is room for 
implied limitations and Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation 
in this sphere. … Th ere are numerous ways of organising and running electoral 
systems…which it is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic 
vision. … [P]risoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the right to liberty, where lawfully 
imposed detention expressly falls within the scope of Article  5 of the Convention 
[guaranteeing the right to liberty and security]. … Any restrictions on these other 
rights must be justifi ed … Th ere is no question, therefore, that a prisoner forfeits 
his Convention rights merely because of his status as a person detained following 
conviction.’46
42 Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 47784/09, ECHR 2014.
43 McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 51987/08, ECHR 2015.
44 Th ese were so-called ‘legacy cases’ that gathered all outstanding prisoner voting cases against 
the UK pending before the Court.
45 Supra n. 39 at §§12–17. Th e Court also rejected the applicants’ claim for legal costs. It did not 
consider that legal assistance was required to lodge an application, for the reasons given in 
Firth and Others. Th e Court’s approach to follow-up cases was made clear in that judgment, 
which was both concise and unambiguous. No legal assistance was required to consider its 
implications.
46 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-II, §§58–61 and 69–7.1.
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Th e UK Government, however, has clearly held fi rm to its position on a 
continuation of prisoner disenfranchisement. A Ministry for Justice Spokesman 
reiterated the Government’s stance post ruling that: ‘Th e government has always 
been clear that it believes prisoner voting is an issue that should ultimately be 
decided in the UK. However, we welcome the court’s decision to refuse convicted 
prisoners costs or damages.’47
Commenting on the above and the UK’s refusal to amend the RPA the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission stated:
‘It is for parliament to decide how our laws refl ect judgments from the European 
court of human rights, and today’s ruling does not change that. Th e European court 
cannot change the UK’s laws. It would be for parliament to decide which of the 
possible convention-compliant approaches is introduced. It is important that the UK 
complies with the convention not least to reinforce our position when we ask other 
countries to respect human rights.’48
It is clear that the situation in the UK regarding prisoner disenfranchisement 
and the involvement of the ECtHR is not aided by the current political situation. 
Where tensions with the Court and perceived interference in what is seen as a 
central policy decision to disenfranchise incarcerated off enders is particularly 
provoking for the electorate. Notably the UK Government perceive the ECtHR 
as overstepping its ambit, infringing upon domestic matters:
‘In recent years the Court seems to have forgotten that its job is to apply the principles 
of the Convention as originally intended by those who signed it… As a result, we 
now fi nd ourselves in a situation where the Court is trying to impose judgments on 
Britain which would have astonished those who signed the Convention.’49
In refusing to implement the current jurisprudence from the ECtHR, the UK is 
actively engaging in denialism, by not recognising the supremacy of the ECHR 
system on human rights issues and by denying the incarcerated their right to vote 
as recognised by jurisprudence from the Strasbourg Court. Speaking on this issue, 
Sean Humber, legal counsel for some of 554 plaintiff s in McHugh stated that:
‘Despite the European court of human rights having fi rst ruled that the UK 
government’s blanket ban on allowing prisoner voting was unlawful a decade ago, 
and confi rming the unlawfulness of this blanket ban in a succession of further 
47 Quote taken from O.  Bowcott ‘UK prisoners banned from voting not entitled to 
compensation’ 2015 Th e Guardian www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/10/uk-prisoner-
voting-ban-breached-human-rights-european-court-rules accessed on 16.04.2015.
48 Ibid.
49 D.  Davis and J.  Straw, ‘We must defy Strasbourg on prisoner votes’ 2012 Th e Telegraph 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9287633/We-must-defy-Strasbourg-on-
prisoner-votes.html> accessed 13.04.2015.
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judgments ever since, the government stubbornly refuses to act…We are in a position 
where the government appears to take a perverse pleasure in unlawfully breaching 
the human rights of thousands of its citizens. It should be extremely worrying to all 
of us that the government seems to have so little regard for its international human 
rights obligations or the rule of law.’50
Th e next part of this paper will address and highlight the weakness of the 
UK’s justifi cations for the on-going disenfranchisement of the incarcerated, 
evidencing the lack of contextual basis and easily rebuttable nature of this 
current denialist position.
3. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BAN ON PRISONER 
VOTING RIGHTS
As is oft en the case when engaging with denialists and cases of denialism, the 
basis for the UK’s current position and resulting blanket ban is an easily refuted 
one. Speaking on the usage of denialist tactics Justice of the South African 
Supreme Court, Edwin Cameron notes that denialists will usually cling to and 
draw extensively upon easily disproved arguments, employing ‘distortions and 
half-truths.’51 Th e current vilifi cation by the UK Government of the ‘interfering 
Court’ is clearly a prejudiced view of the Strasbourg body. Cameron notes 
that such ‘misrepresentations of their opposition’s position’52 are oft en key to 
denialist tactics, where the perpetrator seeks to establish themselves in an ‘us and 
them’ type scenario, where the inference is that the opposition is out of touch 
or misguided about the principles the denialist advocates.53 Th is is certainly the 
case in the prisoner disenfranchisement debate, as this section will evidence.
Th e disenfranchisement of prisoners in the UK dates back to the Forfeiture 
Act 1870 and was linked to the notion of ‘civic death’, whereby through the crime 
committed the right to partake in elections is removed through lack of a civic 
responsibility. Th e 1870 Act denied off enders their rights of citizenship and any 
person convicted of treason or a felony sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
exceeding 12 months lost the right to vote until they had served their sentence 
and then regained their civic duties. Th e Representation of the People Act 1969 
(hereinaft er the RPA) codifi ed the legislation further, permanently introducing a 
specifi c provision into electoral law, that convicted persons were legally incapable 
of voting during the time that they were detained.
50 Supra n. 43.
51 E. Cameron, ‘Th e Dead Hand of Denialism,’ edited version of his Edward A Smith Annual 
Lecture at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Programme on April 8. 2003 Mail & Guardian 





Th e UK has cited many diff erent reasons for the continuation of prisoner 
disenfranchisement, there are three main points, which provide a basis for the 
continuation of a blanket ban; the notion of civic death or civic virtue; the Social 
Contract Th eory; and the assumption that denying prisoners the right to vote 
enhances sentencing aims.
Th e justifi cations and reasoning behind these will be examined, alongside the 
contrary evidence, which will challenge the validity of each of these and their 
usage as part of the prisoner voting ban.
3.1. CIVIC DEATH ARGUMENT AND HISTORICAL 
JUSTIFICATIONS
Regarding the notion of ‘civic death,’ Juliet Lyon, Director of the Prison Reform 
Trust, has said:
‘People are sent to prison to lose their liberty not their identity. Th e UK’s outdated 
ban on sentenced prisoners voting, based on the 19th century concept of civic death, 
has no place in a modern democracy and is legally and morally unsustainable. 
Experienced prison governors and offi  cials… believe people in prison should be able 
to exercise their civic responsibility.’54
Although this is the most used justifi cation used to justify the continuation of 
a blanket ban on voting for those imprisoned, it is undoubtedly the weakest, 
stemming from the fact that those who utilise the argument have yet to explain 
its usage. Further, a brief overview of the history of this particular justifi cation 
serves well to undermine its very practise. Th e claim of civic death suggests 
that through the act of their crimes, that prisoners lose their civic virtue, are no 
longer worthy of being aff orded civic duties and as a result befall ‘civic death.’ It 
is apparent therefore that the relationship between the individual and the state 
changes radically when one is found guilty of an off ence and incarcerated. Th e 
use of civic death as a justifi cation was discredited by Lord Sumption during 
a recent Supreme Court consideration of the prisoner voting debate, when the 
judge outlined that depriving prisoners of the vote:
‘[I]s not and never has been a form of outlawry, or ‘civil death’ (the phrase 
sometimes used to describe the current state of the law on prisoners’ voting rights). 
54 Juliet Lyon, Director of the Prison Reform Trust, quote sourced at: Government Has Six 
Months To Overturn Prisoners’ Voting Ban:
 <www.prisonreformtrust.org.
United Kingdom/ProjectsResearch/Citizenship/BarredfromVoting>.
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On the contrary, until the 1960s, it was mainly the incidental consequence of other 
rules of law.’55
Th e very term ‘civic death’ conjures forth draconian ideas of having damaged the 
democratic process and as a result losing all rights. In the past, this was known 
as outlawry or attainder, terms which fed into the Forfeiture Act 1870. Defi ning 
either of these is not an easy task, however, to summarise Blackstone outlawry 
and attainder were clearly related:
‘When sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment in the laws of 
England, is pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence by the common law 
is attainder. For when it is now clear beyond all dispute, that the criminal is no longer 
fi t to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to human 
society… He is then called attaint, stained, or blackened. He is no longer of any credit 
or reputation; he is dead in law.’56
Th e Forfeiture Act 1870 is regularly cited as the source of prisoner 
disenfranchisement in English law.57 However ironically, the 1870 Act was 
enacted to liberalise the ancient system of the attainder, intended ‘to give a 
simple remedy for an oppressive injustice.’58 Th e Act retained several restrictions 
on the civic participation of convicted felons serving more than 12 months’ 
imprisonment, including preventing them from voting or standing as candidates 
in any election for the duration of their imprisonment. It is important to note 
here, that due to the temporal clause (sentences over 12 months) that although the 
Act is commonly cited by Parliament as justifi cation of a continued ban, that if 
the Act itself were to be enacted in present day that it would pass the requirements 
of the ECtHR in abolishing a blanket ban allowing some class of prisoners to vote.
Notwithstanding the intentions of the Act, the realities were very diff erent, 
as in practise even those who qualifi ed to vote under the limited statutory 
restrictions meant that all classes of convicted prisoner, including those 
held on remand, continued to suff er ‘administrative disenfranchisement’ 
where prisoners were oft en prevented from attending the polls by way of their 
incarceration. However, the fact that the act was not followed in practise does 
55 Sumption L at para. 164. R (on the application of Chester) (Appellant) v Secretary of State 
for Justice (Respondent) McGeoch (AP) (Appellant) v. Th e Lord President of the Council and 
another (Respondents) (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63 On appeal from: [2010] EWCA Civ 1439; 
[2011] CSIH 67.
56 Quote from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769).
57 See C.R.G, Murray, ‘Playing for Time: Prisoner Disenfranchisement under the ECHR aft er 
Hirst v. United Kingdom’ (2012) 22 Kings Law Journal 309–334, and C.R.G.  Murray, ‘A 
Perfect Storm: Parliament and Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2012) Parliamentary Aff airs 
1–29, pp. 4–12.
58 C. Forster, MP (1980) 30 HC Deb 200, 932.
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not take away from the fact that in theory the Act is much more accommodating 
to prisoners than the current RPA.
Th e idea of the blanket ban being intrinsic to British democratic process 
becomes more illogical when one considers the upheaval of voting rules 
surrounding World War II, particularly those pertaining to prisoners, whereby 
all prisoners were allowed to vote.59 Th e fi rst important alteration of the UK’s 
electoral arrangements occurred when the post-war Labour Government 
introduced postal ballots under the RPA 1948, making them available even 
to individuals ‘no longer resident at their qualifying addresses.’ Th is simple 
amendment meant that that, ‘prisoners confi ned in prisons outside their 
constituencies would be accepted by Returning Offi  cers as eligible to vote by 
post.’60 Following the enactment of the Criminal Law Act 1967, prisoners across 
the UK, regardless of the length of their sentence, could participate by postal 
ballot in the parliamentary by-elections and local government elections held 
between January 1968 and April 1969. However, progress in this area was turned 
on its head with little debate in Parliament,61 in a remarkable move when all 
convicted prisoners throughout the UK were again disenfranchised under the 
RPA 1969.62
What is clear from a brief overview of the idea of civic death, and the 
attached history of the term, is that it clearly cannot be said that the blanket 
ban has long been a strong and steadfast part of British history. Even this 
perfunctory account has proved that the law has been subject to toing and froing 
on the subject and that the current blanket ban is still only a relatively recent 
phenomenon.
In terms of progression, it is also noteworthy here that as the remainder of 
the penal system has evolved, the blanket ban is a key provision that has not, 
holding on steadfastly to a tradition inherent more to Victorian than modern 
times. Executions, and the widespread tortuous acts which formed a part of 
the penological system in place when the civic death argument was created, 
are long forgotten, deemed archaic, unnecessary and not in keeping with 
modern penological change. Why, therefore, should the blanket ban be the only 
exception allowed to continue in use?
59 RPA 1948, s. 8(1)(e) and see RPA 1948, s. 8(4)(b) for the requirement that a new address must 
be outside the constituency if a postal vote was sought on the basis of not being resident at a 
qualifying address.
60 In the years following this amendment no serious objection was raised in relation to the 
enfranchisement of prisoners in Britain, on the contrary the success of those in Scottish 
prisons being aff orded the vote with no negligible eff ect felt on the democratic process served 
as justifi cation for this to continue.
61 Ibid.
62 RPA 1969, s. 4.
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3.2. THE CIVIC VIRTUE ARGUMENT
Th e civic virtue and civic death arguments, although predominantly intertwined 
and spawned from the same ideology, diff er on the actual reason or main aim 
of their use. Th e civic virtue argument on the contrary stems from the actual 
abstract and objective committing of a crime as a member of a democratic 
process. Th is strand of this argument asserts that when one violates the laws one 
participated in creating, that one defaults on the agreement to respect the law 
and hence forfeits any right to assist further in creating it.63
However in order to say that prisoners lack civic virtue, certain 
generalisations must be inferred about their character and although it is true 
that people who break the law seemingly do not respect the law, the justifi cation 
on this premise for taking away their vote appears to create or infer a second 
punishment. Traditionally in most jurisdictions, most sentences for crimes 
appear in the form of incarceration, thereby invoking the issue that if there 
has already been a punishment given, then what is the second crime then that 
prisoners are being punished for by forfeiting their vote?64 Under the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 fi ve diff erent rationales for sentencing off enders are set out, 
the fi rst being punishment that is proportionate to the seriousness of the 
crime committed.65 It is clear here then that the blanket ban could aff ect this 
section of the criminal justice act. John Hirst, for instance, the prisoner who 
brought the issue to the European Court of Human Rights in 2005, was given 
a 14-year sentence but was detained longer by the parole board because he was 
considered to be of potential danger to the public. By this point, he had served 
the supposedly punitive part of his sentence, but continued to be punished by 
not being allowed to vote.
Clearly, Hirst unnecessarily received greater punishment than his trial 
judge felt was proportionate because of this. Essentially disenfranchisement is 
fundamentally an additional punishment and as such requires an additional 
justifi cation, particularly when one takes this provision of the Criminal Justice 
Act into account, yet none has as far as this author can gage, ever been supplied. 
Consequentially this idea of civic death or a second punishment appears 
jurisprudentially to be morally unjustifi able. Th omas Hammarberg, former 
63 In other words, if you refuse to follow the law, you clearly do not respect it and should lose the 
ability to partake in its development.
64 Incarceration as a punishment is particularly noteworthy, as recent developments have 
indicated alternatives to imprisonment, what would occur in these situations, if say, someone 
is under house arrest or serving an alternative means of sentencing can they still vote if they 
are remaining at their own address? It is evident that disenfranchisement only operates when 
you are imprisoned. Why is that? Because it is seen that only the most serious off ences result 
in imprisonment, but that is clearly not always the case. In addition, how does this work re 
remand prisoners who have not been convicted?




Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe, has articulated his 
opinion on this matter stating that:
‘Prisoners though deprived of physical liberty, have human rights… Measures 
should be taken to ensure that imprisonment does not undermine rights, which are 
unconnected to the intention of the punishment.’66
It is clear therefore the civic virtue argument is decidedly weak and standing 
as it does on feeble and unpersuasive evidence. Th e term civic virtue is used as 
haphazardly as civic death in support of prisoner disenfranchisement, with little 
evidence that its proponents can even defi ne the essential term of the premise 
nor explain how it justifi es the ban.
3.3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Th e idea of a social contract as advocated for by Jacques Rousseau and Th omas 
Hobbes can be simply summarised in this context as the following: that people 
who misbehave have broken a social contract, and must be punished by the 
stripping of the rights supplied by the said contract. Th e Social Contract presents 
two main forms of argument; the fi rst is that rights have corresponding duties, 
and secondly with respect to the right to vote, the duty of the citizen is to uphold 
the social contract (in practice, not to break the law). Th erefore, by respecting 
the law and acting upon the duties prescribed by the Social Contract the citizen 
receives certain benefi ts.
Th e Social Contract theory has been used to justify the current stance taken 
in Australasia by the Australian and New Zealand Legislators respectively. 
In Australia, prisoners serving sentences of more than three years are denied 
the right to vote, and the Australian Human Rights Commission recognised 
that this is in breach of the State’s obligations under Article 25 ICCPR. In New 
Zealand, the position is much more severe, mirroring the UK’s stance with the 
eff ect that no person incarcerated aft er the amendment could register on the 
electoral roll.67 Sam Bookman, writing for the New Zealand Human Rights Blog 
discusses the basis and consequences of this amendment:
‘To the untrained eye this fl ies in the face of section 12(a) of our Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and section 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR). But to the apparently learned eye of politicians, we can justify any measure 
66 Quote by Th omas Hammarberg taken from, T.  Whitehead, ‘Denying prisoners 
the vote makes them ‘non people’ says human rights chief.’, 2011 Home Aff airs 
<www.telegraph.co.United Kingdom/news/United Kingdomnews/law-and-order/8419767/
Denying-prisoners-the-vote-makes-them-non-people-says-human-rights-chief.html>.
67 In late 2010, New Zealand amended section 80(1) (d) of the Electoral Act 1993 to refl ect this ban.
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that causes prisoners ill on the basis that they have already committed a wrong, and 
hence deserve to suff er the consequences of that wrong.’68
Th e use of the Social Contract argument places a great deal of trust and onus 
onto the eff ectiveness of the criminal justice system in the UK, as in order for the 
Social Contract theory to stick as a justifi cation, we would need to ensure that all 
criminals are incarcerated or there would need to be an insured and complete 
consistency in sentencing process and a clear delineation of such. Pursuant 
to this, the Social Contract Th eory gives no guidance as to how we should do 
this or how we should create this degree of seriousness and minimal threshold. 
Furthermore, this argument neglects the comparative and complementary 
question of whether society has upheld its duties to the criminal, the person 
given obligations under the Social Contract. In short, we must not forget that the 
contract is bilateral. A further issue with this argument is how or why exactly 
the punishment for breaking or forsaking obligations under the Contract is 
disenfranchisement. On this point, it is evident that merely showing criminals 
have clearly disregarded criminal law, does not make clear which of those rules 
they should lose the protection of:
‘Th e Government have submitted that the measure pursues the aim of preventing 
crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners and also the aim of enhancing 
civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law … the Government stated that the 
aim of the bar on convicted prisoners was to confer an additional punishment … it 
may nevertheless be considered as implied in the references to the forfeiting of rights 
that the measure is meant to give an incentive to citizen-like conduct.’69
Th e second strand of the Social Contract argument can perhaps be off ered as 
an indicator of why the punishment manifests itself in such a way. Th e Social 
Contract theory asserts that when one violates the laws one participated in 
creating that the criminal defaults on the agreement to respect the law and 
68 Currently in Australia, people who have been sentenced for more than 3 years in prison do 
not have the right to vote in federal elections while they are serving their sentence. Some 
argue that it may be reasonable to punish prisoners who have committed serious crimes by 
depriving them of the right to vote. However, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
considers that depriving persons who have been convicted of a felony of the right to vote does 
not meet the obligations in article 25 of the ICCPR nor does it serve the rehabilitation goals of 
article 10(3) of the Covenant. (Human Rights Committee 18 December 2006) Th e Australian 
Human Rights Commission does not support the view that prisoners should have their right 
to vote suspended during their period of imprisonment. For an excellent analysis of this see: 
Sam Bookman Denying voting rights to prisoners in New Zealand: What was Parliament 
thinking? March 14th, 2013
 <http://nzhumanrightsblog.com/newzealand/denying-voting-rights-to-prisoners-in-new-
zealand-what-was-parliament-thinking/>.
69 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, §74, ECHR 2005-II.
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hence abdicates any right to assist further in creating it.70 In short, while the 
fi rst argument is based on the fact of the law breaking, the latter part of the 
argument claims that society can deny the vote to citizens based on an inference 
about their attitude to the law, given their law-breaking. In summary both the 
civic death and Social Contract argument appear to follow, the rather arbitrary 
approach that if you refuse to follow the law you clearly do not respect it and 
should lose the ability to partake in its development.
3.4. ACHIEVING SENTENCING AIMS
A further justifi cation oft en presented in favour of a continuing ban on prisoner 
enfranchisement is the premise that the blanket ban serves certain sentencing 
aims. During a recent statement providing evidence before the Joint Committee 
on the Draft  Voting Eligibility (Prisoner) Bill, the Right Honourable Jack Straw 
MP (former Home Secretary and Justice Secretary) and David Davies MP 
(former Shadow Home Secretary and Minister for Europe) both advocated this 
approach.71 Notwithstanding this opinion, the use of sentencing aims as a 
justifi cation for denying the vote is in the author’s opinion the weakest of the 
three. Th is weakness stems exclusively from the fact that whenever this point is 
given, that no actual evidence or reasoning is provided, it is merely stated that a 
blanket ban aids sentencing aims and the prisoner’s rehabilitation.
Consequently, despite the over-generalisation of politicians contrary to this, 
research proves that maintaining a life as close to normality as possible will make 
re-integration an easier process, aide rehabilitation and diminish recidivism 
rates upon the prisoner’s release.72 Th is point was recognised by Judge Cafl isch 
in Hirst (No2) at para. 5 of his concurring judgment where he stated that:
‘Th e UK Government further contended that disenfranchisement in the present case 
was in harmony with the objectives of preventing crime and punishing off enders, 
70 For more on this point or for a contrasting view of democracy as an exclusionary system 
see P.  Ramsay, Faking Democracy with Prisoners’ Voting Rights, LSE Law Society and 
Economy Working Papers 7/2013 London School of Economics and Political Science & Law 
Department.
71 Th e Right Honourable Jack Straw MP & David Davies MP appearing as witnesses before the 
Joint Committee on the Draft  Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill on: Wednesday 17  July at 
9.36am. Ended at 10.41am.
72 For more on prisoner disenfranchisement and rehabilitation see: S. Easton, ‘Electing the 
Electorate: Th e Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2006) 69 Th e Modern Law Review 3, 
pp. 443–452. For the value of education on rehabilitating prisoners see: J.S. Vacca, ‘Educated 
Prisoners Are Less Likely to Return to Prison’ (2004) 55 Journal of Correctional Education 4, 
pp. 297–305; for more general writings on the merits of rehabilitation see: M. Monash and 
E.A. Anderson, ‘Liberal Th inking on Rehabilitation: A Work-Able Solution to Crime’ (1978) 
25 Social Problems 5, pp. 556–563; P. Lutz, Probation and Rehabilitation. Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology (1931–1951) Vol. 25, No. 6 (Mar. – Apr., 1935) pp. 914–917; C.R. Tittle, 
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thereby enhancing civic responsibility (judgment, §50). I doubt that very much. I 
believe, on the contrary, that participation in the democratic process may serve as a 
fi rst step toward re-socialisation.’73
Also reiterating this point was Dr. Peter Selby, former Bishop to Her Majesty’s 
Prisons and now President of the National Council for Independent Monitoring 
Boards for Prisons who has stated that:
‘Denying convicted prisoners the right to vote serves no purpose of deterrence 
or reform. What it does is to state in the clearest terms society’s belief that once 
convicted you are a non-person, one who should have no say in how our society is 
to develop … It is making someone an ‘outlaw’ … it has no place in expressing a 
civilised attitude towards those in prison.’74
Th e justifi cation itself however follows several trains of thought, the fi rst of those 
being denunciation. Th e supporting claim here is that the loss of the vote sends 
a clear message to the wrongdoer about the evil of their conduct: are we telling 
them that because they are a bad person they will not only be incarcerated but 
also further excluded as they committed a crime and their opinion is no longer 
valued? Th e second aim off ered under the title of sentencing aims, is deterrence. 
Much like its predecessor, this is also deeply fl awed yet is unfortunately 
frequently off ered by governments such as the UK and Australia as a reason for 
denying the vote.75 Th e government defended deterrence as the main purpose 
behind the blanket ban in Hirst:
‘Th e Government argued that the disqualifi cation in this case pursued the intertwined 
legitimate aims of punishing off enders, enhancing civic responsibility and respect for 
the rule of law by depriving those who had breached the basic rules of society of the 
right to have a say in the way such rules were made for the duration of their sentence. 
Convicted prisoners had breached the social contract and so could be regarded as 
(temporarily) forfeiting the right to take part in the government of the country.’76
‘Institutional Living and Rehabilitation’ (1972) 13 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 
3, pp. 263–275; C.A.  Visher and J.TRAVIS, ‘Transitions from Prison to Community: 
Understanding Individual Pathways’ (2003) 29 Annual Review of Sociology pp. 89–113.
73 Hirst v. Th e United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, Concurring Opinion of Judge Cafl isch, §5, ECHR 
2005-II.
74 ‘People in prison are citizens, says Archbishop ahead of prisoners voting debate’ 2011 Prison 
Reform Trust <www.prisonreformtrust.org.United Kingdom/PressPolicy/News/vw/1/
ItemID/114> accessed 11.08.2011.
75 Th e Australasian governments have been particularly adamant about the merits of prisoner 
disenfranchisement and sentencing aims. For a more detailed and subjective, account of this 
see S. Bookmann, ‘Denying voting rights to prisoners in New Zealand: What was Parliament 
thinking? 2013 NZ Human Rights Blog <http://nzhumanrightsblog.com/newzealand/
denying-voting-rights-to-prisoners-in-new-zealand-what-was-parliament-thinking/>.
76 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, no. 74025/01, §51, ECHR 2005-II.
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However, there is little evidence to support this stance and therefore this 
justifi cation fails for two reasons. Firstly, policy makers are assuming that 
people know about disenfranchisement laws. However, upon commencing 
research on prisoner disenfranchisement, it became quickly apparent that not 
many people actually know about prison disenfranchisement. While this may 
be a generalisation, it is one supported by many working and writing on this 
topic.77 As evidence suggests however the majority of those incarcerated are 
more concerned with maintaining their personal and familial relationships 
and losing their freedom than with their suff rage.78 Th us, the deterrence value 
of the deprivation of a right to vote is slim to none. Acknowledging that there 
are of course exceptions to each rule it appears that if a person has chosen to 
forsake their civil liberties that deprivation of their electoral rights may not 
provide eff ective deterrence. On the contrary, greater civic involvement actually 
contributes to an easier transition into life post-incarceration.
4. POLITICS, POLITICAL DENIALISM AND THE 
PRISONER DISENFRANCHISEMENT DEBATE: 
A MORAL PANIC?
Th is section of the paper will address the ‘why’ element, namely why the UK 
has chosen to deny prisoners their voting rights and to deny its international 
obligations and in doing so, the Court’s legitimacy to enforce both Convention 
norms. Th e drive behind the UK’s act of political denialism is clearly framed 
against the backdrop of the changing attitudes to the ECtHR within the UK. 
Th is section will highlight that within acts of political denialism, there is oft en 
an element on which the perpetrator can fasten their argument. In the case 
of the UK, this would initially be the aforementioned justifi cations based on 
‘democratic traditions,’ but also those based upon the creation of a ‘moral panic,’ 
with two parallel and interconnected aims. Th e meaning of this in the context of 
the prisoner voting debate will be discussed shortly.
As a founder of the ECHR, one could be forgiven for thinking that the UK 
would be a staunch supporter of the Convention system and associated Court. 
More recently however, the UK’s relationship to the ECtHR has become tinged 
with controversy. Leading politicians advocate an enhanced approach to 
77 S.  Bookmann, ‘Denying voting rights to prisoners in New Zealand: What was Parliament 
thinking? 2013 NZ Human Rights Blog http://nzhumanrightsblog.com/newzealand/denying-
voting-rights-to-prisoners-in-new-zealand-what-was-parliament-thinking/>. See also 
Murray and Wagner supra n. 53 and 59.
78 Th e Right Honourable Jack Straw MP & David Davies MP appearing as witnesses before 
the Joint Committee on the Draft  Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill on: Wednesday 17  July 
at 9.36am. Ended at 10.41am and see: S.EASTON, ‘Electing the Electorate: Th e Problem of 
Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2006) 69 Th e Modern Law Review 3, pp. 443–452.
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domestic protection of ECHR rights, as evidenced during the UK’s chairmanship 
of the Council or Europe and there is renewed interest in the age of subsidiarity 
present at the Brighton Conference.79 As these issues fall beyond the constraints 
and remit of this paper, they will not be considered, however what is important 
here is the general attitude present within the current UK government towards 
the ECtHR and prisoner voting rights.
‘It is frustrating and disappointing to see that, largely because of a single judgment 
concerning the right to vote of some categories of convicted prisoners, the court has 
become a sort of hate fi gure, not just in the popular press, but also in the soundbites 
of politicians.’80
As articulated in the opening part of this paper, the UK is a knowing and complicit 
perpetrator of political denialism. In denying prisoners the vote for political 
motivations, the UK is blatantly disregarding the judgments of the ECtHR on 
prisoner disenfranchisement. It is suggested, that in exploring why the UK is 
denying to recognise and fulfi l its Convention obligations, that there is an element 
of moral panic at play. Th at the prisoner voting debate is not only an example of 
political denialism but also of an ‘overreaction’, or creation of a moral panic.81
79 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Final Report on measures requiring 
amendment of the European Convention on Human Rights (CDDH/2012/R74 Addendum I), 
15  February 2012, www.coe.int/t/dgi/brightonconference/Documents/CDDH-amendment-
measures-report_en.pdf. Th e PM, speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, lamented the current interventionist approach of the Court and touted enhanced 
subsidiarity as key to building a more understanding relationship between states and the 
Court. In doing so he referenced both terrorism and prisoner disenfranchisement as prime 
examples of the Court’s fl aws. He went on to propose that where a state had democratically 
debated the issue and once the judgment had passed the scrutiny of the domestic judiciary 
that the Court should not be able to intervene in the matter. Th e members of the assembly, 
which Cameron addressed, agreed and voted in a total majority that the Court should become 
subsidiary to national courts and bodies, acting in an enhanced advisory role.
80 N. Bratza quoted in E. Bjorge, ‘Prisoners’ Voting Rights: Th e Gift  Th at Keeps on Giving,’ 
2012 Oxford Human Rights Hub <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/prisoners-voting-rights-the-gift -
that-keeps-on-giving/> accessed 16.04.2015.
81 It is interesting to note here the work of those such as A. Von Hirsch, and M. Wasik, [‘Civil 
Disqualifi cations Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework’ (1997) 56 
Cambridge Law Journal, 599.] supported by C.R.G.  Murray, ‘A Perfect Storm: Parliament 
and Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2012) Parliamentary Aff airs 1–29], who maintain that the 
fact that prisoners were invited and urged to vote during and post WWII in order to maintain 
a proper electorate completely undermines the main justifi cation for the blanket ban; that it is 
a traditional and historic feature of the United Kingdom’s electoral tradition;
 ‘Universal disenfranchisement of prisoners has not been an ever-present feature of the United 
Kingdom’s electoral system over the last century. Indeed, the restrictions on the franchise 
have oft en rested on very limited legal authority and, by the middle of the twentieth century, 
were subject to extensive exceptions. Nonetheless, in an attempt to persuade the electorate 
that prisoner disenfranchisement is hardwired into the United Kingdom’s system of 
representative democracy, the opponents of prisoner enfranchisement continue to insist that 
it was ‘never an issue in the British prison system until the lawyers got hold of it through the 
European Convention on Human Rights.’ [B. Jenkin, MP (2011) 523 HC Deb. 494].
Samantha Morgan-Williams
358 Intersentia
Cohen suggested in his book Folk Devils and Moral Panics, that a moral 
panic occurs when a ‘condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defi ned as a threat to societal values and interests.’82 Cohen saw moral 
panic and denialism as connected ideas, and this is certainly true within political 
acts of denialism.83 ‘Cohen’s understanding of the overreaction to putative social 
problems, most evident in moral panic, is balanced by his keen observation on 
the underreaction in which knowledge of human rights violations is concealed 
and denied.’84
If moral panic is the ‘overreaction’, the denialism is representative of an 
underreaction, the turning of ‘a blind eye to human rights abuses perpetuated 
by the state.’85 Indeed prisoner disenfranchisement fulfi ls many of the 
characteristics that Goode and Ben-Yehuda developed from Cohen’s principles, 
characteristics which determine whether an event is a moral panic, they list 
these as concern, hostility, consensus and disproportionality.
Firstly, there is clearly concern that enfranchising prisoners will have a 
negative eff ect on society.86 Secondly, there is hostility towards prisoners due 
to their having committed a crime to become incarcerated; this is supported 
by a consensus among both the public and polity that the incarcerated provide 
a risk to society. Finally, it can be argued that the support behind a continued 
ban on prisoner enfranchisement is rooted in disproportionality especially as 
evidenced above, that enfranchising prisoners is linked to better rehabilitation 
post-incarceration and the majority of European countries have no means of 
restrictions on the voting rights of those incarcerated.
It is thus suggested, that where the act of denying prisoners their voting rights 
is an act of political denialism, that the reasoning behind this denial rests upon 
the creation of two elements of ‘moral panic’ and that intrinsically for a political 
power to rely upon denialism that an element of moral panic is key.87 Th e fi rst of 
82 S. Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics, MacGibbon & Kee, London 1972.
83 S. Cohen, ‘Human rights and crimes of the state: the culture of denial’ (1993) 26 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 2, 97–115.
84 M. Welsh, ‘Moral panic, denial, and human rights: scanning the spectrum from overreaction 
to underreaction’ in D. Downes, P. Rock, C. Chinkin and C. Gearty, Crime Social Control 
and Human Rights From Moral Panics to States of Denial: Essays in Honour of Stanley Cohen, 
Willen Publishing, London 2007.
85 M. Welsh, ‘Moral panic, denial, and human rights: scanning the spectrum from overreaction 
to underreaction’ in D. Downes, P. Rock, C. Chinkin and C. Gearty,, Crime Social Control 
and Human Rights From Moral Panics to States of Denial: Essays in Honour of Stanley Cohen, 
Willen Publishing, London 2007.
86 Th is is clearly represented by the traction which the current prisoner voting debate has 
created in the UK, as articulated in this section it is due to the moral panic created by the idea 
that ‘criminals, rapists and paedophiles’ be allowed to vote which has created the impetus for 
the Government to challenge the Court’s decision on this matter.
87 Clearly in order to garner the public support necessary to be elected or to create popular and 
lasting political legacy, politicians need to draw their manifests based on what will encourage 
the electorate to support them and vote for them. In appealing to issues of morality and 
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these is based upon the public’s views on criminals, whereby the majority view 
the enfranchisement of prisoners to be distasteful or morally reprehensible:
‘When a person commits a crime which is suffi  ciently serious to put him in prison, 
he sacrifi ces his liberty, his freedom of association, and his vote. When we vote in 
a government, we choose a group of men and women to make laws on our behalf. 
Convicted prisoners should have no say in this; those who break the law cannot 
make the law.’88
Speaking on this issue David Cameron, Prime Minister, stated that allowing 
those incarcerated to partake in the democratic process made him ‘physically ill.’ 
Th is position is strongly represented within public opinion on the matter89 and 
excluding criminals from the democratic process has therefore garnered easy 
support for politicians.
Th e other element to the moral panic surrounding prisoner disenfranchisement 
rests upon the Court’s role. Criticism of the ECHR and the Court is constant both 
among politicians and the public, and the constant vilifying of the Court has 
gained much traction both in politics and through the media:90
‘Th e media, then – in a sense – can create social problems, they can present them 
dramatically and overwhelmingly, and, most important, they can do it suddenly. Th e 
media can very quickly and eff ectively fan public indignation and engineer what one 
might call “a moral panic”.’91
Opposition to human rights has become an apparent favoured policy for 
politicians across the political spectrum especially regarding prisoner voting 
rights. It is clear from the refusal of consecutive governments, since the Hirst 
judgment in 2005, to implement the ECtHR judgments and amending the 
RPA 1998, that prisoner voting rights is not an issue behind which the public 
can align themselves. Rather, it is clear that upholding the ban and connecting 
this to British traditions and values, as many politicians have, is the more 
popular position:
‘In attempting to overrule British law on prisoner voting rights, Strasbourg judges 
have exceeded the limits of their proper authority. If the Court does not refl ect the 
particularly on the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement, clearly a reason why the debate is so 
fraught and contentious is that it appeals to people’s morality and incites a reaction.
88 Talk given to University College London By the Rt Hon Dominic Grieve QC MP Why Human 
Rights should matter to Conservatives, 3rd December 2014.
89 Supra n. 26.
90 One of the reasons politicians fi nd it so easy to criticise human rights is that the popular press 
have laid the groundwork for them to do so. For some of the myths perpetuated by the British 
Press regarding human rights see the excellent rightsinfo.org ‘Th e 14 Worst Human Rights 
Myths,’ <http://rightsinfo.org/infographics/the-14-worst-human-rights-myths/>.
91 J. Young in S. Cohen, Images of Deviance, MacGibbon & Kee, London 1971, p. 71.
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views of member states of the Council of Europe, there will be confl ict. Where the 
court infringes our constitutional rights, we will not back down.’92
It also appears that prisoner voting rights was the ideal issue behind which 
politicians could drive public support, as Professor Helen Fenwick details, the 
prisoner voting rights debate has ‘proved convenient’ for the UK in challenging 
the ECtHR system.
However, it is not just prisoner voting rights that is causing tension between 
Strasbourg and the UK. While the prisoner voting debate highlights most of the 
issues considered to be at stake by the UK Government, there are deeper issues at 
play in how the UK views and interacts with the ECtHR and Convention system. 
It now appears that anti-ECtHR sentiment is so prevalent within politics that the 
Conservative Party has promised to repeal the HRA 1998 if it obtains a majority 
at the 2015 election. Further, the Party has even threatened withdrawal from the 
ECHR and Council of Europe system.93 Speaking on his Party’s plan’s to create 
a British Bill of Rights, Former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, has summed 
up the current issue between the Government and Strasbourg rather succinctly:
‘[T]he real problem for [the Conservatives] is not so much the interpretation of the 
Convention by the Strasbourg Court or indeed our own domestic courts but the 
frustration that an international legal obligation prevents the UK Government from 
being able to ignore judgments when it considers that they are adverse to its view of 
what is in the public interest.’94
Clearly, the second element of moral panic is tied to this representation of 
the Strasbourg Court as an ‘interfering’ or ‘meddling’ Court. A Court which 
oversteps its’ ambit in seeking to enforce ‘un-British values’ upon the UK,95 ‘the 
Strasbourg Court has taken upon itself an extraordinary and unnecessary power 
to micromanage the legal systems of the Member States of the Council of Europe 
(or at any rate, those who pay attention to its decisions.’96
Th is position is proliferated all too willingly by the British press, who 
regularly misrepresent the Strasbourg Court and its judgments, representing 
92 D.  Davis And J.  Straw, ‘We must defy Strasbourg on prisoner votes’, 2012 Th e Telegraph 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9287633/We-must-defy-Strasbourg-on-
prisoner-votes.html accessed 13.04.2015.
93 ‘A Great Day for British Justice: Th eresa May Vows UK to leave ECtHR’ Daily Mail 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2287183/A-great-day-British-justice-Th eresa-May-vows-
UKEuropean- Court-Human-Rights.html> accessed 13.04.2015. Specifi cally over prisoner 
votes: D. Davis and J. Straw, ‘We must defy Strasbourg on prisoner votes’.
94 Talk to University College London By the Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP, Why Human 
Rights should matter to Conservatives, 3rd December 2014.
95 Rt. H.D.  Davies, ‘We Must Defy Strasbourg on Prisoner Votes’ Th e Telegraph 
<www.telegraph.co.UnitedKingdom/news/UnitedKingdomnews/law-and-order/9287633/
We-must-defy-Strasbourg-on-prisoner-votes.html>.
96 L. Hoffmann, Forward to Policy Exchange, Pamphlet 2011.
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the Court as a body in which criminals, terrorists etc. use human rights to 
surpass and trample the rights of UK citizens. Most notable for doing so are the 
Daily Mail, the Daily Express and the Sun, who consistently refer to the HRA 
as the ‘Hated Human Rights Act.’97 Th e Daily Mail is renowned for calling 
the ECHR a ‘charter for criminals and parasites.’ It is easy to see consequently, 
where the support for a ban on prisoner disenfranchisement comes from when 
one considers media portrayals of human rights and the political manifesto on 
human rights issues. In what becomes a vicious circle, the misrepresentations 
peddled by both politicians and media are enthusiastically deployed by further 
politicians and other media outlets, resulting in the situation currently unfolding 
in the UK, where regard for human rights under the Convention system is at an 
all-time low.98
Th erefore, it can be argued that in answering ‘why’ the UK has chosen to 
deny both its obligations under the ECHR system and to deny prisoners the vote 
that the answer clearly lies in the proliferation of the negative attitude towards 
the Court and prisoner enfranchisement. Adam Wagner, QC credits this as 
‘monstering of human rights…where the Human Rights Act and the European 
97 ‘May: Scrap the Human Rights Act. Home Secretary Calls for hated laws to be axed’ Th e 
Sun <www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3848868/May-Scrap-the-Human-Rights-Act.
html>; ‘Tories pledge to scrap ‘dangerous’ Human Rights Act’ Express <www.express.co.uk/
news/uk/381630/Tories-pledge-to-scrap-dangerous-Human-Rights-Act>; ‘Human rights is a 
charter for criminals and parasites our anger is no longer enough’ Mail on Sunday, 15 July 
2012; ‘Human rights laws are a charter for criminals, say 75% of Britons’ 2012 Daily Mail 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2130224/Human-rights-laws-charter-criminals-say-75 
Britons.html> accessed 13.03.2015; ‘Migrant facing deportation wins right to stay in Britain… 
because he’s got a cat’ 2009 Daily Mail <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1221353/Youve-
got-cat-OK-stay-Britain-offi  cials-tell-Bolivianimmigrant.html> accessed 13.04.2015; 
‘Immigrant allowed to stay because of pet’ 2009 Daily Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
newstopics/howaboutthat/6360116/Immigrant-allowed-to-stay-becauseof-pet-cat.html>
 accessed 13.04.2015; D.  Barrett, ‘102 foreign criminals and illegal immigrants we 
can’t deport’ 2011 Sunday Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/8570639/102-foreign-criminals-and-illegalimmigrants-we-cant-deport.html> accessed 
13.04.2015.
98 Arguably leaving the ECHR and CoE system will not resolve all issues that the UK has with 
human rights and external infl uence. Devolution must be considered. Th e Conservative 
Party’s the Bill of Rights Commission eventually fi gured out that devolution is an integral 
part of plans to withdraw from the ECHR system. As a result, Parliament’s options may be 
limited whilst issues surrounding Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and their say in the 
matter remain under-appraised.
 Consequently, the UK would be sending a signifi cant signal to other states also not 
implementing ECtHR judgments. Any justifi cation for leaving must be balanced against 
the very signifi cant signal which the UK would be sending that it has lost confi dence in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the British Bill of Rights would have to 
mitigate all the factors that leaving Strasbourg would arguably create. If the British Bill of 
Rights is not up to par with Convention protections, this would leave individuals in the UK in 
a weaker position against the state if their rights are breached.
 Th e key question is therefore whether the current plans to withdraw from the European 
Court of Human Rights will solve the problems which the Conservative party and press are 
so found of highlighting.
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Court of Human Rights have become monsters in the eyes of the public, and 
those who claim using human rights law have themselves been monstered.’99 In 
short, it appears that this monstering or increasingly poor public and political 
attitude towards the ECtHR has been utilised by the Government to drive public 
support. Consequently, the monstering of human rights is key to the prisoner 
enfranchisement debate, as it is the impetus or driving force behind support for 
the UK’s committing such a blatant act of denialism.100
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the aim of this paper has been to examine the reasoning and 
justifi cations behind support for the continued blanket ban on prisoner 
disenfranchisement in the UK. Th e example of denialism represented by 
prisoner disenfranchisement in the UK has been addressed from two angles. 
Firstly the ‘how’ was explored – how the UK can justify such a blatant denial of 
both the rights of prisoners to vote and as a result deny both the legitimacy of the 
ECtHR and its human rights obligations. Th e main justifi cations – civic death, 
civic virtue, the social contract and the ambiguous achieving of sentencing 
aims – were all explored as valid justifi cations for continuation of the ban. It 
is apparent from an exploration of these that each of the justifi cations is easily 
refuted, undermining any value to the argument proposed in support of the ban.
Secondly, the ‘why’ element was explored, namely why the UK has chosen 
to deny prisoners their voting rights and to acknowledge its international 
99 A. Wagner, ‘the Monstering of Human Rights,’ conference paper delivered at Human Rights 
in the UK Media: Representation and Reality, University of Liverpool, 19  September 2014. 
Paper accessed at <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/09/22/the-monstering-of-human-
rights> accessed 16.04.2015.
100 On this point, academics have suggested many reasons why the Conservative Coalition 
Government has chosen to challenge the Court’s authority. It is argued that this is 
predominantly rooted, as Grieve (referenced in main text) articulates it appears that ultimately 
the ECHR system is viewed as an inconvenient as it gets in the government’s way, or hampers 
certain societal policies. On this point see, A. Hirsch, ‘Th e MPs voting against prisoners, and 
21st century civic death’ 2011 Th e Guardian. M. Elliott, ‘Repealing the Human Rights Act, 
withdrawing from the ECHR: be careful what you wish for’ 2013 Public Law For Everyone 
<http://publiclawforeveryone.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/repealing-the-human-rights-act-
withdrawing-from-the-echr-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/>; C.  Murray ‘Prisoner Voting: 
Th e Human Rights Issue that Keeps on Giving’ 2013 Bloglovin <www.bloglovin.com/frame
?post=1278443997&group=0&frame_type=a&blog=6976793&link=aHR0cDovL2ZlZWRw
cm94eS5nb29nbGUuY29tL35yL2h1bWFucmlnaHRzL2t4THUvfj MvNE9oUXpEZnU0SHM
v&frame=1&click=0&user=0>; J.  Duff y, ‘Apocalypse soon? Th e UK without the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ 2013 UK Human Rights Blog <http://ukhumanrightsblog.
com/2013/05/17/apocalypse-soon-the-uk-without-the-european-convention-on-human-
rights/>; H. Fenwick ‘An appeasement approach in the European Court of Human Rights?’ 
2012 UK Constitutional Law Association <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/04/05/helen-
fenwick-an-appeasement-approach-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/>.
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obligations, consequently denying the Court’s legitimacy to enforce the 
Convention. Th e main reason why this concrete case of denialism is playing 
out was addressed against the backdrop of the changing attitudes to the ECtHR 
within the UK. It was highlighted that within acts of political denialism, there 
is oft en an element on which the perpetrator can fasten their argument. In the 
case of the UK, this was held to be the aforementioned justifi cations based on 
‘democratic traditions,’ but also those based upon the creation of a ‘moral panic,’ 
with two parallel and interconnected aims. One side of which is fuelled by public 
distaste for those incarcerated and the other driven by an undermining of the 
ECtHR system through vilifying of the Court.
Th us, while it is clear that being devoid of strong justifi cations will not cause 
the UK to depart suddenly from its current position, it does amount to a certain 
lack of credibility regarding its adopted position on the rights of prisoners to 
vote in the face of clear decisions to the contrary by the ECtHR. Th is lack of 
credibility when coupled with the continuing threat of not only being still in 
breach of treaty obligations holds to seriously undermine the UK’s stance as a 
key fi gure within European human rights, especially as the UK continues to 
fl out the Court’s rulings in refusing to implement the judgments, lift ing the 
blanket ban.
Th e validity of these justifi cations is evidently not of concern to the UK as 
proponents of this concrete case of denialism. Rather, this is grounds within 
which to utilise public policy arguments to justify a political stance against an 
international legal body (the ECtHR). Th is paper has addressed these public 
policy insights and justifi cations to gain insight into concrete situations 
where a human rights abuse is supported by and committed by a State itself. 
In highlighting both how the UK has attempted to justify its current position 
and why it is committing such a blatant denial of human rights and its’ 
international obligations, this paper seeks to contribute to research within 
political motivated instances of denialism against human rights provisions. 
Th e prisoner voting rights debate thus provides an excellent example within 
which to address why and how denialism is committed, and consequently how 
a leading state within the European human rights system can justify continued 
human rights violations.

